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The first grand wave of twentieth century 
cognitive science and philosophy of mind 
sought and still seeks to show how, contra 
Cartesian dualism, cognition is materialized 
in the brain. A new wave is rising from this, 
though, one that studies cognition not 
merely as “embrained” (Damasio 2000, 118; 
Collins 2000) but as embodied in a much 
stronger sense, as inseparable from and 
shaped by the concrete extra-cerebral 
structures and dynamics of the body, and the 
body’s embeddedness in the natural and 
social world. This wave is gathering 
momentum. Whereas a decade ago 
researchers needed to protest that cognition 
is in fact strongly embodied, one can now 
find studies that leap right to the problem of 
how and in what sense it is so. This is a 
telltale sign of a nascent paradigm shift. Yet, 
in studying this new wave one finds that 
philosophy and science are still—for reasons 
recently remarked (see Dreyfus 2007; 
Gallagher 2007) and soon discussed—at sea 
for lack of conceptual frameworks to bring 
embodied cognition back to firm land. 
Brooks, whose robotics research is part of 
the new wave, puts it succinctly: “perhaps at 
this point we simply do not get it, and there 
is some fundamental change necessary in 
our thinking.” (1991; cited in Dreyfus 2007, 
251)  
Since the study of embodied cognition 
surges with deeply conceptual problems and 
is in the midst of a sea change, this chapter 
cannot simply summarize fully worked out 
results. It is inevitably synthetic. Given the 
handbook’s overarching goal, my aim is to 
show how an older wave of philosophy—the 
phenomenological tradition initiated by 
Husserl—can, on the conceptual level, 
complement new wave empirical results in 
cognitive science.  
Phenomenology is well positioned for 
this complementary role. If philosophy in 
general is in the business of creating or 
analyzing the concepts we deploy in our 
everyday and scientific labours, 
phenomenology’s distinctive task is to have 
rigorous description of the phenomena drive 
philosophy’s conceptual endeavour. And 
whereas science normally fits empirical data 
into existing conceptual frameworks, 
shifting paradigms only in moments of 
crisis, phenomenology begins with a 
principled conceptual crisis—the 
reduction—that puts our most basic 
concepts into question. The reduction is 
never left behind and it radically shifts 
paradigms all the way down. But it shifts 
paradigms by holding itself responsible to 
what empirically presents itself. So, as 
Russon (2006, 308) notes, phenomenology 
is a form of empiricism in which we “let our 
(rigorously enacted) observations specify the 
terms and parameters of our theories, rather 
than holding description answerable to 
theory.” Phenomenological and empirical 
studies of embodied cognition can therefore 
mutually constrain or enlighten one another 
in ways that let phenomenologically inspired 
researchers contribute to new wave research. 
(See, e.g., Varela 1996; 1999; Gallagher 
1997, 2005; Thompson 2007;  also see 
Schmicking in this volume   Petit 2003; 
Borrett, Kelly, and Kwan 2000). But, given 
the nature of the conceptual problem that is 
outlined below, instead of pursuing this 
strategy of mutual constraint, I lean more 
heavily on phenomenology’s basic 
conceptual results, whilst keeping 
phenomenology in conversation with 
empirical studies.  
The next section develops the 
conceptual problem by introducing and 
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explaining the strong thesis that cognition is 
embodied and outlining the 
phenomenological view of it.  
Empirical Studies of Embodied 
Cognition and the Spectres of 
Crypto-Cartesianism 
What could it mean to challenge 
traditionally neurocentric views by making 
the strong claim that cognition is ‘embodied 
over and above being embrained’, by 
claiming, for example, that the hands have 
some role in cognition? And why would one 
ever say such a thing? One reason is to 
exorcise hidden, crypto-Cartesian1 
conceptual prejudices about body and mind 
that do not fit the empirical evidence and 
consequently hobble traditional approaches. 
As shown below, empirical studies pressure 
science into discarding traditional concepts 
of the body as inadequate in accounting even 
for walking, an obviously embodied activity. 
So we should be all the more suspicious of 
deploying such concepts in trying to unify 
body and mind. But we will see that even as 
we try to escape these problematic concepts 
our tradition tangles us in further crypto-
Cartesian prejudices—which is why we 
should turn to phenomenology as deriving 
results on a different conceptual level. 
Empirical studies give evidence that 
human walking is controlled not by 
neurology alone but is shaped by leg-
environment dynamics (Thelen 1984, 1995; 
Thelen and Smith 1994) and even social 
factors (cf. Zelazo 1983, 1984; Fogel 1993). 
Further, there is evidence that muscular 
synergies crucial to limb control are not 
specified by fixed anatomical structures but 
by “soft assembled,” dynamic, 
environmentally modulated functions 
(Turvey 2007). Studies of biped, quadruped, 
and hexapod animals show that their gait 
pattern is best explained in terms of 
structured leg dynamics inherited through 
evolution, rather than central neural 
controllers (Full and Farley 2000). Robots 
that control walking through central 
processors cannot handle shifting terrain and 
require far more energy and actuator 
precision than are found in humans. These 
problems can be tempered by leveraging the 
dynamic morphology of leg joints, and of 
the body as linking legs together, for 
control. (Brooks 1991; Collins et al. 2005) 
Simulations show that body symmetry (vs. 
asymmetry) facilitates control of locomotion 
and increases locomotory efficiency 
(Bongard and Paul 2000). 
While traditional accounts 
conceptualize limb control as a problem 
solved by the brain, the empirical studies 
show that the dynamic body is itself integral 
to control. Where traditional accounts thinly 
conceive the brain as a computational device 
(whether serial, parallel, or 
neural/distributed), the new wave thickens 
this by showing how the body itself is 
integral to the brain’s controlling 
‘computations’. The mind not only extends 
into notepads, etc., that do cognitive work 
(as Clark and Chalmers (1998) argue), it 
extends into limbs that do work in their own 
control. The traditional, thin concept of the 
body as a dumb machine is thereby also 
thickened, because the body itself, in virtue 
of its dynamic morphology, has a kind of 
‘know how’ or “cleverness” (Csepregi 
2006).  
Embodiment thus matters over and 
above embrainment—embodiment does 
cognitive work. To put it more sharply: The 
body is not a passive puppet moved by the 
brain as sole controlling agency. The body 
(with its brain) is a controlling agency. 
Were we to extend this thesis to 
cognition in general we would say: the body 
is a cognizing agency. In this case the 
infamous “brain in a vat” (conjured to show, 
contra Cartesianism, how cognition can be 
embodied by way of being embrained) 
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would be a misguided, vatic abstraction. 
More, it would in fact be disembodied, for it 
lacks the right kind of body to do thinking, 
namely the moving body so vital to kinetic 
coping and evolution. (See Sheets-Johnstone 
1999, 1990) But can we extend this thesis to 
cognition, which is after all, our topic? An 
objector will surely say that the above data, 
while convincing in showing embodiment’s 
importance to actions such as walking, has 
no bearing on cognition proper.  
In reply, we must first of all emphasize 
that walking is not merely limb movement, 
but intelligent interaction with the 
environment. So points about walking are 
already points about a discerning, judging, 
cognitive activity. But such activity has its 
roots in the body. For example, the complex 
locomotory response of cockroaches blasted 
with compressed air is too quick to be 
explained by nerves and is instead rooted in 
viscoelastic musculoskeletal structures 
(Dickinson et al. 2000, 103). The structure 
of the cricket body and ear, over and above 
neurology, is integral to its orienting to the 
chirps of other crickets. (Clark 2001, 127-8) 
Sheet-Johnstone (1999; 2003) shows in 
detail how bodily, animate movement 
already is intelligence. The body itself is a 
mindful responder. Perhaps neurology 
merely complicates the already supple 
adaptive richness of bodily responses (see 
Wheeler 2005, 134, 195-211).  
Besides, the objection is premised on 
sharply dividing action, perceptual cognition 
and ‘higher order’ cognition from one 
another, so as to rule out drawing 
conclusions from one domain into the 
others. But thinkers as diverse as Dewey 
(1972), Merleau-Ponty (1962), Varela 
(1991; 1993), Hurley (1998), Berthoz 
(2000), O’Regan and Noë (O'Regan and 
Noë 2001, 2001; Noë 2004), Wheeler 
(2005), Thompson (2007), and Turvey 
(2007, 663) argue that the traditional action-
perception-cognition distinction is 
conceptually and/or empirically misguided. 
As Gallagher (2005, 136) insists, 
“[p]erceptual experience is generally 
accepted to be fundamental to other modes 
of cognition and action.”  
This point is amply confirmed by 
empirical evidence that action, perception, 
and embodiment mix in shaping ‘higher’ 
cognition. Just some of this evidence will 
now be mentioned. For example, 
psychologists show that walking is integral 
to the infant’s cognitive development 
(Kermoian and Campos 1988; Fogel 1993; 
Thelen 2000). Tactile cognition is shaped by 
movements, skills and habits of touching 
(Katz 1989; Lederman and Klatzky 1987). 
Similarly, visual cognition is shaped by 
looking (Merleau-Ponty 1962; Churchland, 
Ramachandran, and Sejnowski 1994; 
O'Regan and Noë 2001; Thompson 2007). 
Rhythms of the moving body influence our 
hearing metrically ambiguous six beat 
musical rhythms as being either in three 
groups of two beats, or two groups of three 
beats. (Philips-Silver and Trainor 2007)    
On the level of language and thinking, 
studies show that sentence formation is not 
wholly governed by abstract syntax but is 
influenced by bodily speech rhythms alien to 
vatic embrainment (Lee and Gibbons 2007) 
and that body language is integral to thought 
and language, rather than being a merely 
external accompaniment (McNeill 1992). 
Gesture also facilitates human learning. 
Specifically, in learning, bodily gestures that 
are initially topologically isomorphic to a 
learning domain are metonymically 
shortened in ways that give rise to more 
abstract typological symbols that facilitate 
the learning of abstract concepts. (E.g., 
gestures mimicking atomic attraction 
contract into shorthand symbols for atomic 
bonds.) (Roth and Lawless 2002) 
Chimpanzee manipulation of what Clark 
(2006, 294) calls “material symbols” 
suggests that such symbols can facilitate 
3 
high order cognition, for example, they 
facilitate chimpanzee judgement that the 
relations of difference and sameness are 
different relations. Together these points 
might suggest that the gestural body itself is 
a material symbol whose flexibility is 
integral to cognition—that we learn not by 
abstract symbol manipulation but by way of 
generating new symbols through our body’s 
manipulation of things. This is a point well 
anticipated by Merleau-Ponty (1962) in his 
studies of expression and helpful in 
addressing the notorious symbol grounding 
problem (see, e.g., Thompson 1997).  
It also resonates with Lakoff and 
Johnson’s analyses of how our thinking and 
imaging is organized by schemata rooted in 
bodily ways of doing things. For example, 
the schema of something moving from a 
source, along a path, to a goal—a schema 
initially grasped on a bodily level—
underlies metaphors in multiple cognitive 
domains (e.g., “I am trying to reach the end 
of this chapter”). (Lakoff and Johnson 1999; 
Johnson 1987, 2007; also see Gibbs and 
Berg 2000) Similar phenomena suggest that 
the roots of thinking (Sheets-Johnstone 
1990) and even mathematics (Lakoff and 
Núñez 2000) are in the moving body. Data 
on mental imagery tasks (such as watching a 
moving object and reporting its final 
position from memory) further suggest that 
imaging involves a kind of internal gesture 
or material symbol manipulation rooted in 
our bodily relation to things (versus an 
abstract symbol transformation). (Gibbs 
2006; Gibbs and Berg 2000; Amorim and 
Isableu 2006) Researchers have also 
demonstrated what should probably be 
called the Proust effect: recall of 
biographical episodes is faster when body 
position during recall is congruent (vs. 
incongruent) with body position during the 
original episode. (Djikstra, Kaschak, and 
Zwaan 2007; cf. Casey 2000; Sheets-
Johnstone 2003)  
Over and above the brain, the 
morphology, dynamics and temporality of 
the body, and our evolved, moving attitude 
to the environment, shape and lurk in our 
acting, perceiving, speaking, learning, 
remembering, and conceptualizing. This link 
between the body and cognition is supported 
in recent neurological literature, which 
shows that ‘higher’ cognitive processes 
(involving activation of ‘higher’ brain 
structures) in fact also activate and are 
activated by ‘lower’ brain structures known 
to be active in emotional affect, in 
proprioreceptive and visceral processes, and 
in body control. As Tucker puts it, it “may 
be that there are no brain parts for cognition, 
at least not separate from the brain 
mechanisms pertaining to bodily functions.”  
(Tucker 2007, 14; also see Damasio 1999; 
2000; 2003; Freeman 1999; Gallagher 2005; 
Berthoz 2006; Thompson 2007) All of this, 
plus the observation that—as William James 
(1950, 138; cf. Sheets-Johnstone 1999, ch. 
10) notes—the brain evolved as an organ of 
action at one with the body, make it 
empirically implausible to think that there 
would be anything like human thinking in a 
vat other than our body, or that thinking in 
general is a purely embrained matter. Tragic 
evidence for these points is given by the 
closest thing we have to empirical studies of 
brains in vats, namely notorious studies at 
McGill university by Ewen Cameron and 
Donald Hebb (see Kubzansky 1961) of 
people deprived of sensory stimulation and 
self-movement. On the Cartesian or 
embrainment view, an immobilized mind 
would simply have nothing much to think 
about. But people who are deprived of 
‘embodiment over embrainment’ lose their 
minds—their thinking is severely disturbed, 
implying that the mind is deeply mobile and 
bodily. 
To review the above, by way of 
condensing and elaborating Wilson’s (2002, 
626) identification of six views of embodied 
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cognition: 1) Cognition is situated in a real-
world environment and inherently mixes 
perception and action. 2) Cognition is 
responsive to real-time demands and 
operates through the real-time dynamics and 
rhythms of the body (vs. being a 
rate-independent computational process). 3) 
The environment and the body do cognitive 
work, and 4) are part of cognition. 5) 
Cognition is for action. 6) Even ‘off-line’ 
activities such as remembering, imagining 
and abstract thinking have bodily roots. 
Cognition, in other words, is physically 
grounded (see Anderson 2007), in the sense 
that the physical specificities, rhythms, 
dynamics and shape of the moving body, 
and its embeddedness in the world and 
social settings, matter to cognition in a 
full-fledged way (versus it being the case 
that only basic physics matters to cognition, 
in realizing a wetware computer or 
connectionist pattern recognizer).  
New wave researchers endorse the 
above claims in various mixtures. The 
strong version of embodied cognition 
pursued here would endorse all of them. To 
briefly voice such claims through the work 
of important phenomenologically influenced 
researchers, Sheets-Johnstone (1999) argues 
that taking evolution and the phenomena 
seriously means realizing that:  
At their most fundamental level, 
subjective experiences are tactile-
kinesthetic experiences. They are 
experiences of one’s own body and 
body movement; they are 
experiences of animate form. These 
experiences are the bedrock of 
thinking. (435) 
As Gallagher (2005) puts it, the “body 
actively organizes its sense experience and 
its movement in relation to pragmatic 
concerns” (142)—the body is no mere 
passive receptor—and “a full picture of 
human cognition can be drawn only by 
exposing the details” of this (133).  
Dreyfus (1992; 2002; 1998; 2007; Wrathall 
and Malpas 2000) approaches this issue by 
emphasizing that bodily, skillful coping is 
no mere accompaniment to cognition but is 
itself cognition. In Thompson’s (2007, 256) 
words, “[s]ensory stimulation does not cause 
experience in us, which in turn causes our 
behaviour,” rather (citing O’Regan and Noë) 
“‘skillful activity…is the experience.’” Noë 
(2004) details how bodily action is internal 
to perception and shapes consciousness, 
concluding that a plausible account of 
consciousness “must be an account of [it] as 
a natural phenomenon” (vs. an abstract 
computational phenomenon) and this “will 
be a tale, not about the brain, but about our 
active lives.” (231) Thompson (2007, 128) 
strikes a deeper conceptual chord by arguing 
for an underlying “deep continuity of life 
and mind,” such that “life and mind share a 
basic set of organizational properties, and 
organizational properties distinctive of mind 
are an enriched version of those fundamental 
to life.” In other words, the phenomena 
drive these thinkers to conceive mind as a 
process rooted in evolution and development 
(both individual and social). Mind leverages 
what already belongs to life and to skillfully 
moving, organized bodies. As Johnson 
(2007, 279) writes:  
The human mind is not contained in 
the body, but emerges from and co-
evolves with the body….A human 
being is a body-mind, that is, an 
organic, continually developing 
process of events.  
Why are these claims so new-wave, 
controversial or hard to grasp? Conceptual 
issues are unavoidable here, for noticing the 
empirical phenomena catalogued above is 
not yet the same as having these phenomena 
count as evidence for strong (or even weak) 
versions of the embodied cognition thesis. 
One can easily conceptualize the phenomena 
so as to stick with old-wave embrained 
views. For example, evidence shows that 
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emotional affect is integral to our ability to 
make cognitive judgements (e.g., to decide 
which of two projects to pursue). This is 
what leads Damasio (1999; 2000; 2003) to 
urge ‘embodiment over embrainment’. But 
as Gallagher (2005, 135) points out, in 
actual detail Damasio deflates the body to its 
representation in the brain (or inflates it to 
ideas of the body). For Damasio, the body is 
important—but only as embrained. Data of 
embodiment is muddled into data of 
embrainment without even noticing it. 
Likely we can always (whether deliberately 
or unthinkingly) muddle the data this way. 
For example, physically grounded body 
rhythms can be muddled into relations 
between neural time-stamps registering 
bodily events. What tells us to stick with the 
strong embodiment thesis and what helps us 
pursue it without muddling cannot be mere 
data but conceptual frameworks and 
desiderata.  
But our navigation of this conceptual 
level is swamped by crypto-Cartesian 
prejudices that run so deep as to distort our 
account of the body, never mind mind—
which is why I began with  studies of 
walking. These prejudices keep rising from 
the crypts of our tradition, like conceptual 
vampires that suck the life from cognition. 
Even as we nail Cartesian substance dualism 
into the coffin of dead ideas, it shape-shifts 
into a new dualism of brain and body. Even 
as we exorcise the Cartesian concept of 
mind, we retain an essentially Cartesian 
concept of the body as dumb machine (see 
Merleau-Ponty 1962, 1965; Burwood, 
Gilbert, and Lennon 1999), and thence a 
dualism between the body as living agency 
and the body as passive machine (see 
Thompson 2007, 230-237; Leder 1992)—all 
of which betray bodily phenomena. Indeed, 
Wheeler (2005, ch. 2-3) catalogues eight 
crypto-Cartesian prejudices, tracing their 
cross-linked origins in Cartesianism and 
their persistence in philosophy and science. 
Most are converse to the claims of embodied 
cognition treated above, but it is worth 
noting the prejudices of explaining cognition 
in terms of (1) subject-object dualisms, (2) 
representations (that repair the subject-
object dualism) and their transformations, 
(3) temporally austere terms (such that, e.g., 
physically grounded real-time rhythms 
muddle into rate-independent relations 
between representations); (4) and explaining 
intelligence as the outcome of general 
purpose reasoning (vs. reasoning specific to 
a creature’s evolution).  
To pursue the embodied cognition 
thesis we must shed these crypto-Cartesian 
conceptual habits and see the phenomena 
anew. But here a deeply subtle point comes 
into play. Old-wave research conceptualizes 
embodiment as a solution to the problem of 
how mind fits with matter. Conceptually, the 
problem is how the phenomenon of mind, 
which can be coherently described in terms 
independent of the body, is materialized. It is 
answered by appeal to properties of the 
body, which likewise can be coherently 
described as independent of mind. Old-wave 
philosophy and science accept this framing 
of the problem but endeavour to resolve it 
by showing how the descriptive differences 
can be bridged. Crucially, this formulation 
of the problem remains essentially Cartesian 
and dualist in character. It is no wonder that 
efforts to resolve it lapse into crypto-
Cartesian prejudices or retain residual 
dualisms. (The embrainment thesis in effect 
acknowledges that if body and mind are 
descriptively dualised, then the solution 
requires a special body part (the brain as, 
e.g., symbol processor) capable of doing 
something most unbodylike.)  
Phenomenology radically reframes the 
problem, indeed it shows that the old 
problem is badly put. To anticipate, 
phenomenological description shows that 
the mind is an inherently temporal process, 
that cognitive contents are not given all at 
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once, but take time. But the mind does not 
supply or regulate this time. The mind is 
rather its exposure to a time that exceeds it. 
Husserl finds that this exposure has the form 
of kinaestheses, felt bodily movements.2 
This is why Thompson can insist that 
skillful activity is not the cause of 
experience, but “is the experience”: the 
‘stuff’ of experience is time—and time is 
felt in movement. Along these lines, the 
strategy of the next section is to show that 
mind is body by showing that the time of 
thinking is the time of bodily moving. The 
section after that conversely suggests that 
body is mind by showing that the time of 
bodily moving is not the time of a 
clockwork machine, but of cognizing. We 
typically fail to grasp these points and find 
the strong embodied cognition thesis 
controversial because (as the next section 
suggests) we prejudicially remove body and 
mind from time, reducing them to things 
completely present and given, e.g., to 
Cartesian substances or computational or 
bio-mechanical systems. And we also 
prejudicially tend to reduce time itself to an 
already given dimension. By drawing on the 
theme of time, the following sections are 
meant to give an example of the sorts of 
arguments, conceptual frameworks and 
resources that phenomenology can offer to 
complement recent empirical results on 
embodiment. They also give an example of 
phenomenology’s strategy and approach to 
mind and body.   
Mind is Body: Movement, Time 
and the Prejudice of Presence 
I develop a phenomenological argument that 
mind is body by linking Husserl’s Cartesian 
Meditations (CM, 1991) with his lesser 
known emphasis on kinaesthesis.3 CM 
begins by endorsing Descartes’s argument 
that philosophy, for methodological reasons, 
must begin with the “I think.” But Husserl 
argues that Descartes muddles his beginning 
by prejudging what the “I think” is. So 
Husserl sets out to rigorously describe the 
phenomenon of thinking. He ultimately 
finds that the “I think” is already a 
kinaesthetic “I can.” In other words, 
phenomena of mind, rigorously described in 
their own terms, must already be 
conceptualized as bodily phenomena.  
How does Husserl arrive at this point 
and what does it mean? One of Husserl’s 
fundamental insights is that cognitive 
phenomena always have a horizonal 
character (see esp. CM §19). 
Phenomenological description shows that in 
perceptual experience cognitive objects 
(noemata) are not given all at once. To 
perceive a die is not to have it presented or 
represented as an entirety in a cognitive 
instant. Each actually appearing die-face has 
its sense as a real die-face only through its 
relation to other actually appearing faces and 
through their portending of hidden faces, it 
has its sense in the way that one die face 
leads to another. Hidden faces are only 
potentially apparent, but in turning the die 
they can become actually apparent. The 
sense of the real die as a whole is thus not 
something entirely present, but an invariant 
pattern of an (in principle) unending 
unfolding of actual and potential perceptual 
profiles of the die. The structure of 
““predelineated” potentialities” through 
which such a thing unfolds is what Husserl 
calls a horizon. (CM 82) Horizons are 
dynamic (the die’s predelineated 
potentialities change as one turns it) and 
complexly nested (the sense of the die’s 
six-face lies in its dots as horizonally 
portending each other).  
The above point is about noematic 
horizons—the horizons of objects of 
cognition. But Husserl shows that each act 
of cognition (noesis) also has an horizon—a 
noetic horizon. The cognitive act of 
perceiving this-here real die has its sense in 
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further acts that ongoingly fulfill the initial 
act’s sense (the sense “die” is in the act of 
seeing the six-face turning into the act of 
seeing the two-face). So a cognitive act “is 
never present to actual consciousness as a 
finished datum; it becomes “clarified” only 
through explication of the given horizon and 
the new horizons continuously awakened.” 
(CM 82-83) Both noetic acts and noematic 
objects take time. 
Already the above means that 
perceptual cognition is of itself bodily. First, 
as Thompson (2007, 248) observes, 
following Husserl and Merleau-Ponty (1962; 
1964), the fact that perceptual consciousness 
always unfolds in correlation with unfolding 
object profiles means that objects and 
cognitive acts themselves mark perception as 
endogenously spatial and perspectival—
which “requires that we be embodied,” have 
a bodily place from which we perceive. 
Second, as Landgrebe (1973) emphasizes, 
according to Husserl, each experience, as 
having its sense in a horizonal “indication of 
possibilities,” has the form of: ““I can 
continue and will presumably gain this or 
that new impression from the thing.”” (10) 
That is, experience is not just perspectival: it 
involves spatial perspectives changing over 
time. Moreover, horizonal possibilities of 
change are not represented in some sort of 
completed roster, rather I am aware “of them 
as that which is not yet actual but that can 
take place precisely because I can bring it 
about.” (10, my emphasis) But according to 
Husserl, the “I can” here is bodily: the 
protentive promises of the die’s faces, in 
which rests the very sense “die,” is 
confirmed or disconfirmed in kinaestheses, 
movements initiated and felt in experiencing 
the die. (8) So “[p]erception is impossible 
without the experience we gain in 
kinaesthetic movement.” (11) The 
phenomenological evidence shows that the 
Cartesian “I think,” as taking time, must 
already be preceded by an “I can” and an “I 
move.” The fifth meditation of CM 
emphasizes that this in virtue of what 
Husserl conceptualizes as Leib, the lived 
body (also translated as “animate 
organism”). The Leib is the body felt and 
lived in the “I can move,” a body that is 
inalienably my own. Leib contrasts with 
Körper, a term designating the body as an 
object studied, say, by the doctor.4 The “I 
think” is in and of itself already bodily, for 
thinking is determinate only by way of 
temporally opening to further possibilities 
that exceed presence—and this is by way of 
the moving Leib. (See also Husserl 1989, 
§§59-60; Sheets-Johnstone 1999, 1999, 
1999, 131-140; Zahavi 1994, 2003, 98-109; 
cf. Gallagher 1986)  
It is worth reflecting here on the root 
of Husserl’s divergence from Descartes. In 
the second meditation Descartes notoriously 
argues that I see the wax not with my eyes 
but with my mind. Extraordinarily, 
Descartes’s argument, which concludes by 
splitting the “I think” from the bodily “I 
can,” is driven by the very same horizonal 
phenomena that drive Husserl to the 
opposite conclusion. For Descartes, the wax 
is so excessively horizonal that not even the 
imagination could exhaustively determine its 
identity. This requires an “idea,” which 
alone can determinately comprehend all 
variations of the wax for all time. Seeing the 
wax is therefore an act of judgement that 
subsumes phenomena (that are in principle 
indeterminate) to an idea (that is in principle 
fully determinate). The body could never 
pull off such an act because its very time of 
being is an opening to always excessive 
indeterminacies—bodily time inherently 
invites doubt. So if a Cartesian idea is to 
escape indeterminacy and doubt, it must 
clinch its object via a representational 
relation. This representational relation is 
highly problematic. By virtue of the very 
problem an idea is meant to solve, an idea 
must have a fully determinate content that 
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subsumes or intends something 
indeterminate. So an idea must subsume 
something entirely unlike an idea. Dualism 
is thus foreshadowed in the very notion of 
an idea. 
What is going on here? Faced with the 
phenomenon of horizons as threatening the 
foundations of determinate knowledge, 
Descartes reaches to ideas as something that 
would be fully determinate in face of 
indeterminacy. But the phenomena give no 
evidence of fully determinate entities. 
Objects are certainly not given to us as fully 
determinate. If they were, there would be no 
doubt and no need for philosophy. And the 
phenomena show Husserl that cognitive acts 
are also not wholly determinate but 
horizonal. Likely, Descartes bypasses the 
indeterminacy of the phenomena because of 
a prejudice that runs deep in all our 
philosophy and thinking: the prejudice of 
presence, which motivates his appeal to a 
cognitive content—an idea—that would be 
entirely present, given and determinate all at 
once, that would subsume the indeterminacy 
of changing time to the timeless determinacy 
of unchanging essences. 
For Husserl, Descartes’s problem is 
the solution: the very indeterminateness of 
the horizon, which yet has “a determinate 
structure” (CM 83) that cannot, however, be 
reduced to presence, is what carries the 
sense that Cartesian ideas would determine 
as all present. Brooks (1991) insightfully 
moots the problem that robots run into when 
we engineer them to navigate by fully 
representing the determinacies of an 
environment that is in fact inexhaustible and 
ever changing: he suggests that the 
environment be used as is its own 
‘representation’. Husserl similarly moots the 
Cartesian problem that the phenomena are 
inherently indeterminate and thence exceed 
us: he notes that the phenomena in their very 
temporal indeterminacy are the very 
determinacy needed for knowledge. (As 
Husserl puts it, “The [horizonal] 
predelineation itself, to be sure, is at all 
times imperfect; yet, with its 
indeterminateness, it has a determinate 
structure.” (CM 83)) Indeed, if phenomena 
were wholly present and determinate, then 
truth and verification would have no sense. 
As Merleau-Ponty (1962, 204) would note, 
the six faces of a real die cannot all be 
present to us in the same way at once; the 
reality of die lies in the way it keeps on 
temporally turning up new faces and hiding 
other ones from us.  
In other words, on its deepest register, 
all the crypto-Cartesian prejudices discussed 
above in turn presume the prejudice of 
presence: the prejudice that being and 
beings, whether thingly or cognitive, are, 
ontologically speaking, given all at once as 
fully there. To undo this prejudice we must, 
like Brooks and others discussed above, 
conceive cognitive processes as assembling 
themselves in real-time by way of being 
bodily processes movingly embedded in 
worlds and times that exceed them. But this 
conceptual move is easy to muddle, and we 
can now say why: to stick with it we have to 
overcome the prejudice of presence and our 
related tendency to think that explanation is 
satisfactory only if it comes to a stop with 
something that is all there at once (which 
also means that we tend to explain temporal 
processes by making time into something 
that is all there).  
For example, Lloyd (2004; cf. Varela 
1999), who is inspired by Husserl’s 
emphasis on cognition’s inherent 
temporality, notes our tendency to render 
cognitive states as being entirely present in 
the brain areas that ‘light up’ in fMRI 
imagery. He also notes that we forget that 
fMRI averages brain activity over time such 
that it blurs changes on the rapid time scale 
of thinking. In reducing cognition to fully 
determinate activations we prejudicially 
neglect the way cognition might actually be 
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a matter of rapid micro-temporal rhythms of 
change, kin to horizons of neural activity 
enacted in concert with bodily horizons. In 
this context the objection that kinaestheses 
and Leib can (for the brain in the vat) be 
simulated mistakenly reduces these to 
presence by  abstracting them from the real-
time demands that drive our brainy-body 
evolution, in the way that real rhythm is 
ruined by reducing it to ratios. But our 
technology and conceptual frameworks 
likewise tend to mistakenly envat the real 
brain in a frozen present. Notably, the 
embodied cognition thesis can always be 
refuted by way of reducing its terms to 
presence. Ultimately the only thing that 
testifies against this reduction is the being of 
the phenomenon itself in its own time. But 
that is precisely what the prejudice of 
presence freezes out of the picture.  
Here we must address another 
objection. The above may convincingly 
show that perceptual cognition, perhaps 
even imagining and dreaming, are already 
bodily. Surely, though, this analysis does not 
go through with abstract cognition! But let 
us look at a doctor. As her patient walks 
through the door, her head cocks to listen for 
shuffling feet that betray neurological 
problems, her nostrils sniff for breath odours 
symptomatic of metabolic problems; later 
she taps tympanically on the patient’s torso, 
listening for inner organ problems. The 
doctor experiences her diagnostic reasoning 
unfolding in these kinaestheses. If medical 
reasoning could be abstracted from bodily 
kinaestheses, then likely it would not be 
fraught with the stupendous errors and 
prejudices that Groopman (2007) 
catalogues. Later, when writing up her 
report, she feels her reasoning operating in 
the hesitation of her pen and body, which 
hesitation is her way of thinking that: “But 
maybe this logical option is not the case.” 
(See Johnson 2007, ch. 3) Scientific 
reasoning, too, proceeds through 
kinaesthetic engagement with images and 
apparatus (see Galison 1997), and the 
process of writing things up and conversing 
about them.  
Our earlier point that noetic activity is 
horizonal indicates a deeper 
phenomeno-logic behind these last points. If 
my thought “triangle” did not or could not 
actually temporally lead through its horizon 
to the thought that its angles sum to 180 
and so on (and to noematic objects verifying 
these), then I would either doubt that I am 
really thinking “triangle,” or think that I am 
changing its ideal sense (by thinking, say, of 
spherical triangles). The sense of even ideal 
objects lies in the fulfilment of their horizon 
potentials. But for me as human, not divine, 
fulfilling these horizons takes bodily doing 
and time. If you put me into a sensory 
deprivation tank or a 1984-like polity that 
perverts all recording and communication, 
then I shall go mad, for I shall lose track of 
the sense of my own thinking. As Husserl 
argues in his later Crisis of the European 
Sciences (1970) and “The Origin of 
Geometry” (available in Merleau-Ponty 
2002), community, history, “writing down,” 
and moving one’s Leib in a shared 
life-world are crucial to abstract ideas and 
thinking, a point amplified in the cogito 
chapter of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology 
of Perception (1962; also see Merleau-Ponty 
2002). From this perspective, the Cartesian 
“evil genius,” who could even make us 
doubt that 2+2=4, is not an all powerful 
mind but… disembodiment itself. To put the 
brain in any ‘vat’ other than the body is to 
subject thinking to such ineradicable doubt 
that it is driven mad or mistakes itself for an 
all knowing divine. In contrast, the mind 
conceptualized as Leib is itself open to 
endless temporal horizons that at once 
account for doubt (without which we could 
not be philosophers) and for its resolution 
via kinaesthetic, intersubjective explorations 
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and recordings (without which we could not 
be scientists). 
As Husserl compactly puts it, in one of 
the most pungent sentences of CM: “Objects 
exist for me, and are for me what they are, 
only as objects of actual and possible 
consciousness.” (99) But, as Husserl 
immediately insists, we need to give a 
concrete account of this possibility and 
actuality. In doing so we find that the 
kinaestheses of the Leib, as the kernel site of 
actuality and possibility, are indispensable to 
all objects—including abstract ones—such 
that, as Gallagher (2005, 1-5, 133-8) might 
put it, prenoetic bodily processes are prelude 
and postlude to each noesis. The mind is not 
so much given in the head, yet subsequently 
extended into things, as Clark and Chalmers 
(1998) have it. The mind is its extension in 
living moving bodies, its opening in time. 
Aside from his discovery of horizons, 
one of Husserl’s other great discoveries is 
intentionality: that all consciousness is 
consciousness of something, that 
consciousness is of itself a relation to a 
content. For the tradition we are criticizing, 
the phenomenon of intentionality is a great 
problem that repeats the Cartesian problem 
of ideas: how can a subjective representation 
be intentionally related to an outside object 
wholly unlike it? What we are in effect 
learning is that intentionality is in fact the 
solution to the Cartesian problem—once we 
understand that intentionality is bodily and 
inherently temporal, rather than being the 
presence of a (fully present) cognitive state 
to an external object.  
On this analysis, the phenomenological 
labours of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty are 
(merely) crucial inflections of Husserl. 
Merleau-Ponty (1962) deepens the point that 
intentionality is inherently bodily, through 
his well known discussion of the intentional 
arc, Leib and bodily habits and movement. 
(See Barbaras 1992, 2003; Gallagher 1995, 
1986, 1986; Gallagher and Marcel 1999; 
Dreyfus 2002; Leder 1992, 1990) 
Heidegger’s Being and Time (1962) expands 
Husserl’s treatment of the moving body by 
showing, in effect, that the sphere of the 
moving Leib is in fact the complete sphere 
of interpretation that is our intersubjective 
world: the prenoetic body is in fact prenoetic 
human reality. (Cf. Dreyfus 1992, 1991; 
Dreyfus and Hall 1982; Olafson 1987) And 
Being and Time further shows how the 
proper conception of human reality entails 
overturning the prejudice of presence and 
temporally austerity. It requires thinking of 
being as time—and not reducing time to a 
present dimension. 
The conceptual points articulated here 
by way of phenomenology complement the 
ones articulated earlier via empirical study. 
But phenomenology presents a strategic and 
methodological advantage in drawing its 
point directly from the phenomenon of 
thinking and flagging deep conceptual 
prejudices that we will have to undo if we 
are not to muddle our study of embodied 
cognition. 
Body is Mind: Bringing the 
Zombie to Leib  
Above we saw that the phenomenon of 
mind, when rigorously described, is not 
something wholly present to itself but is an 
open temporal transcendence that exceeds 
itself. This is to say that mind is body, for 
the term “body” simply designates and 
describes the phenomenon in which this 
temporally open self-transcendence is 
figured and takes place. (Cf. Russon 2006) 
And so we can better grasp the claim that 
mind is body by better grasping how the 
body, as this temporally open self-
transcendence, is thus already mind. I do 
this by briefly indicating three 
phenomenological arguments.  
First, I pursue a point on the cusp of 
our intertwined claims that mind is body and 
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body is mind. Once we abandon the 
prejudice of presence and turn to a 
temporally rich phenomenology of mind, we 
find (as Husserl showed in detail) that 
memory is crucial to mind, both as primary 
memory (which implicitly retains the 
unfolding present so that, e.g., we can hear a 
note as following the previous one) and as 
secondary memory (which explicitly recalls 
episodes of the distant past). But as Casey 
(2000), Sheets-Johnston (2003) and Russon 
(2003) observe, memory is not strictly 
speaking ‘in the head’: it is in our body and 
the places we inhabit. The body in its 
kinaesthetic engagement with places and 
markers is a well of memory integral to 
mind—the body in the world is itself the 
first “writing down.” Correlatively this 
suggests that one’s body already works as 
memorial mind. 
Second, the thought that the human 
body is merely a dumb, mindless Cartesian 
machine is just the thought that the concept 
of a “zombie” is coherent. In philosophy of 
mind a zombie is (the equally fictional and 
unempirical) counterpart of the brain-in-the-
vat: a body without a mind for a mind 
without a body, a creature who looks and 
acts just like you and me but is not in fact 
thinking or experiencing. Thompson (2007, 
232) subjects this concept to a devastating 
critique via Husserl. Basically, if perception 
and perceptual behaviour have horizonal 
structures—and they must, given the 
phenomenon of perception—they entail 
experience of bodily kinaestheses, that is, 
awareness and anticipation of one’s bodily 
kinaestheses. So if zombies are 
behaviourally indistinguishable from 
humans perceiving things, they must be 
experiencing, kinaesthetic bodies. So the 
zombie-body must be a Leib, not a Körper. 
The zombie who behaviourally treats the die 
as real must have a feel for the die turning in 
hand. I might add that if mind is 
descriptively characterized as unfolding 
according to kinaesthetic horizonal 
structures, if mind is not some kind of 
presence over and above this, then a 
zombie-body moving according to mindful 
horizons and temporality is in its very 
movement already mindful. There is no 
further sort of thing for a mind to be, no 
further ‘place’ in which to find mind—
although there are further developmental 
layers to bodily mindfulness, and these 
would be crucial to differences between 
mindfulness in the broad sense exhibited by 
animal bodies in general, and its elaboration, 
through the incorporation of language, tools, 
and culture, in the phenomena we find, for 
example, in human minds. The above 
suggests how movement of the Leib as 
whole is of itself mindful. This does not 
amount to behaviourism, for behaviourism 
claims that mind is nothing other than 
behaviour conceptualized as something all 
present. What the above asks us to see is 
rather that we must not conceptualize 
behaviour of the Leib as mere changes 
between states that are all present, but as 
ontologically escaping presence, via the 
temporality of behaviour. 
Third, from Husserl onward, 
phenomenologists have long criticized the 
“theory theory of other minds” (TTM). TTM 
addresses the Cartesian problem of other 
minds. If there is nothing mindful about the 
body itself, and we do not encounter other 
minds directly but only through the bodies 
associated with them, how can we know that 
others around us have minds and are not 
merely zombies? TTM’s answer is this: to 
explain the behaviour of other bodies, we 
find we need a theory, one that invokes 
another mind as a theoretical-explanatory 
term. We thus encounter other minds 
through theoretical inferences. Husserl, 
Merleau-Ponty (1962; 1964), and other 
phenomenologists argue that we do not have 
the data necessary for making this sort of 
inference, and that in any case the 
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                                                                        phenomena testify against TTM. One 
encounters another not by way of theory, but 
by a more fundamental, prenoetic “pairing” 
between one’s Leib and another Leib. (CM 
§§49-54) This counter-claim gains empirical 
support from developmental psychology and 
neurology. For example, the discovery of 
mirror neurons (which activate either when 
one makes a particular meaningful gesture, 
say tearing, or sees another doing it) 
suggests that one relates to others as 
meaningfully moving bodies who are 
counterpart to oneself (see Gallagher 2004). 
But this would mean that the other’s body 
already appears as itself being a 
phenomenon of mind. And this would make 
a great deal of evolutionary sense. What we 
moving animals most need to do is look out 
for other moving animals as out to get or 
help us. From an evolutionary and 
phenomenological perspective, bodies that 
move in organized ways already appear to 
us as mindful. We Cartesians can doubt this, 
but we are sure not to when a zombie-body 
starts hunting us down with exceptional 
stealth and cunning.  
Conclusion  
Altogether, the phenomena and the 
imperatives of life testify that cognition is 
embodied in the strong sense. But we 
continually do not notice this, or we deflect 
telltale phenomena, by stepping outside the 
flow of time and life onto a temporally 
austere platform through which we hope to 
secure the fully present terms that would 
satisfy certain prejudicial presumptions of 
explanation. Both empirical and 
phenomenological studies, however, suggest 
that this step is misguided. We must bring 
mind back to life, conceive body and mind 
as two aspects of the same continually 
developing temporal process.  
 
1 The degree to which Descartes himself 
endorses the crypto-Cartesian and Cartesian 
prejudices here discussed is controversial. I 
use these terms broadly, to refer to positions 
derived from or referred to Descartes, 
whether rightly or wrongly. 
2 The deployment of kinaesthesis at this 
point raises the problem that the concept of 
kinaesthesis might already depend on a 
distinction or indistinction between mind 
and body, such that the overall 
argumentative strategy is troubled. (My 
thanks to Daniel Schmicking for pointing 
out this problem.) We can venture a reply 
that, descriptively, mind and body appear as 
relative terms within the more primordial 
phenomenon of kinaesthesis. We do not find 
notes of a melody outside of a melody, and 
vice versa. Similarly, we do not find 
coherent moments of kinaesthesis outside of 
their overarching temporal organization, and 
vice versa. The thought here is that the 
different temporal moments through which a 
kinaesthesis unfolds stand as the relative 
body of this kinaesthesis, and the 
organizing, temporalizing flow internal to 
and overarching these moments stands as the 
relative mindfulness of the kinaesthesis. The 
moments and their temporalizing, the 
bodilynesss and the mindfulness, are not two 
different things, although they are 
distinguishable. In this view, mindfulness is 
exposure to time via the bodilyness of 
movement, but mindfulness is this exposure 
as a temporalizing that runs through the 
moments. Pursuit of this point would, 
though, take another paper.  
3 On this topic and its neglect in the 
reception of Husserl, see Sheets-Johnstone 
(1999), Zahavi (1994), Zahavi (2003). 
4 On Leib vs. Körper see Leder (1992). 
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